Run-up of Acquirer's Stock in Public and Private Acquisitions by Cumming, D & Li, D
Title Run-up of Acquirer's Stock in Public and Private Acquisitions
Author(s) Cumming, D; Li, D
Citation Corporate Governance, 2011, v. 19 n. 3, p. 210-239
Issued Date 2011
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/177786
Rights Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License
  
RUNUP OF ACQUIRER STOCK IN 




Acquisition announcements generate predictable movements in acquirer stock.  For 
example, post-announcement returns are typically negative for high Tobin’s q acquirers, stock 
transactions, and foreign targets, but positive for venture capital-backed private targets.  Pre-
announcement trading of acquirer stock is more likely to be attributable to insider trading when the 
pre-announcement price changes match the expected post-announcement acquirer returns.  Based 
on a sample of Canadian acquirers and public and private acquisition targets from Canada, the U.S. 
and 31 other countries over the years 1991-2008, we find evidence consistent with insider trading 
of acquirer stock.  This evidence, however, is limited to specific situations and is far from 
generalizable to all types of acquisition announcements.  The evidence thereby has policy 
implications for the allocation of surveillance efforts for initiating insider trading investigations. 
 
Keywords: Acquisitions, Insider Trading 





Abnormal returns prior to the announcement of an acquisition do not by themselves imply 
the existence of insider trading.  Detecting insider trading prior to an acquisition is a difficult task, 
rendering surveillance of insider trading and enforcement of insider trading laws problematic.  In 
fact, empirical evidence has shown that insider trading laws by themselves without effect 
surveillance or enforcement can have perverse effects of increasing the acquisition costs and making 
the market reaction to acquisition announcements stronger, thereby increasing the profits to, and 
hence prevalence of, insider trading (Bris, 2005; Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2009).  Empirical studies 
have shown that even some developed countries such as Canada  appear to be among the worst in the 
world for the prevalence of insider trading (Bris, 2005; King, 2009). 
 
In light of the difficult task of detecting and enforcing insider trading, it is worthwhile 
examining situations when price movements prior to the announcement of an acquisition are 
consistent with insider trading and warrant further investigation.  The price response to the 
announcement of an acquisition generates predictable movements in acquirer stock depending on 
the characteristics of the acquisition.  For instance, post-announcement returns are typically 
smaller or even negative for acquirers of foreign firms due to risks, information asymmetries and 
transaction costs (Eckbo and Thorburn, 2000).  Post-announcement returns are typically negative 
when the acquirer pays in shares and has a high Tobin’s q because the market inference is that the 
acquirer’s equity is overvalued (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  By contrast, announcement returns are 
positive for acquirers that purchase venture capital (VC)-backed private companies due to the 
governance and value-added provided by the VC (Masulis and Nahata, 2009).  Taken together, this 
body of evidence shows the announcement effects of acquisitions on acquirer stock are predictable. 
 
Pre-takeover announcement of acquirer stock is more likely associated with insider trading 
in cases where the pre-announcement runup matches expected post-announcement acquirer returns.  
In this paper we consider pre-announcement stock price and transaction dynamics of Canadian 
acquirers that acquire private and public domestic and international targets.  To the best of our 
knowledge, prior work has not explored the pre-announcement runup of the acquirer in response to 
public versus private acquisitions.  In this paper, we make use of detailed data that enables the 




Canada offers an interesting institutional setting to study insider trading of acquirer stock for 
a number of reasons.  First, targets are not just public companies; a significant number of acquisitions 
also involve private firms.  Second, a significant number of targets are not based in Canada, but 
rather, they are based in the U.S. and many other countries around the world.  This type of 
heterogeneity in the data enables assessment of different types of target firms and associated pre-bid 
announcement of the dynamics of prices and transactions.  Third, while Canadian legal systems are 
similar to the U.S., there appears to be a comparative dearth of enforcement in Canada relative to the 
U.S., thereby leading prior international empirical studies of insider trading to rank Canada as the 
most prevalent insider trading nation in the world (Bris, 2005; King, 2009).  
 
We consider a sample of 770 Canadian acquisition announcements of public and private 
targets based in Canada, the U.S. and 31 other countries over the years 1991-2008. The data 
consistently indicate pre-bid announcement runup in cumulative abnormal returns (hereafter “runup 
CARs”) varies in predictable ways.  It is noteworthy that this runup is not visually apparent in 
aggregate; rather, one must investigate the specific characteristics of the acquisition and compare 
announcement returns for acquisitions with similar characteristics, and then compare the expected 
announcement effect with the CARs over the runup period. 
 
Specifically, the data indicate runup CARs are lower for acquisitions when the bidder has a 
higher Tobin’s q and exhibits greater information asymmetry as proxied by the standard deviation 
of the market model.  Runup CARs are lower for foreign targets but higher for VC-backed private 
targets. These findings are cconsistent with studies of announcement affects of foreign acquisitions 
in Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) and announcement of VC-backed acquisitions.  For non-VC-backed 
acquisitions, runup CARs are on average negative, but there is significant heterogeneity across 
quintiles.  Finally, runup CARs are lower for share payments, consistent with theory in Myers and 
Majluf (1984) showing negative performance associated with signals from insiders that their equity 
is overvalued.  These findings are both statistically and economically significant and robust to a 
number of robustness checks, such as 2-step treatment regressions for the non-random choice to 
target a private firm, alternative explanatory variables, different event window lengths, and subsets 
of the data.  Further, we analyze different market benchmarks for generating CARs, and examine 
cumulative abnormal volume, transactions and turnover. 
 
Our findings have policy implications for guiding surveillance authorities in terms of 
optimizing insider trading investigations.  The data and findings enable regulators to examine 
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announcement of different types of acquisition transaction more efficiently.  That is, the data and 
empirics provide as to where insider trading is more likely to be observed, and as such, where 
surveillance and enforcement could be more efficiently directed. 
 
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the prior literature and summarizes 
stylized facts for the post-announcement returns.  Section 3 introduces the data and provides 
summary statistics.  Multivariate regression analyses are presented in section 4.  Concluding 
remarks follow in section 5. 
 
2. Related Literature and Stylized Facts 
 
Empirical studies show that stock price performance of an acquirer depends on the deal and 
firm characteristics including target public status, method of payment, relative size (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984; Chang, 1998; Fuller et al, 2002; Moeller, 2004).  Consistent with this extant evidence, 
our prior is to expect a relationship between those features and the runup CARs.  Moreover, if the 
runup CARs are actually due to insider trading, the magnitude of the price movement should be 
affected by the leakage of private information, or information asymmetry. Considering our 
international setting, we expect that the pre-announcement will differ between domestic, U.S., and 
other foreign acquisitions.  At a broad level, we expect the runup CARs to match expected post-
announcement returns if there is an insider trading action worth investigating.  To this end, in this 
section we review related literature that has established stylized facts regarding the extent to which 
announcement returns are predictable. 
 
2.1. Related Literature  
 
Our paper is related to the literature that studies price runup before takeover 
announcements.  This literature focuses on the price dynamics of target firms and not the acquirer.  
These studies find that, in general, target firms experience significant price increases prior to the 
public announcement of the takeover event.1  For example, Keown and Pinketon (1981) examine a 
sample of 194 firms involved in takeover bids and find that approximately half of the market 
reaction occurs before the first public announcement date. The substantial price increase in target 
shares are interpreted as preliminary evidence of insider trading on non-public material 
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information, and thereby followed up with an examination of the trading activities of corporate 
insiders. Using a unique database of prosecuted SEC insider trading cases from 1980 to 1989, 
Meulbroek (1992) confirms that CAR on insider trading days is half as large as CAR on 
information announcement days, and 43% of the price runup occurs on insider trading days. 
Jabbour, Jalilvand and Switzer (2000) find that abnormal stock price performance at an early stage 
before the acquisition announcement is due to actual trading by corporate insiders using a sample 
of 128 Canadian acquisitions from 1985 through 1995.  Related evidence shows unusual trading 
activity before takeover public announcements (Keown and Pinketon, 1981; Meulbroek, 1992; 
King, 2009).   
 
Comparatively fewer studies examine price and trading activities of the acquirer firm prior 
to the announcement of a takeover. One important exception is Seyhun (1990a), who analyzes the 
trading patterns of top corporate managers in bidder firms around the announcement of takeover 
attempts using a sample of 393 U.S. mergers and tender offers from January 1975 to March 1986. 
Seyhun finds that bidder executives tend to trade heavily prior to the announcement of a takeover 
bid, and there is a significant relationship between the nature of the insiders’ trades and the market 
reaction of the acquisition announcement. Specifically, in takeover bids with positive (negative) 
excess returns, bidder insiders tend to be purchasers (sellers) of their own firm’s shares in the 
months leading up to the announcement.   
 
Although Seyhun (1990a) confirms the existence of insider trading in bidder’s stocks, it is 
not without limitation due to the exclusion of insider trading by both non-executive insider and 
non-corporate insiders.2  First, not all insiders are directors or managers. Szockyj and Geis (2002) 
show that, among all civil and criminal charges in the U.S. between 1980 and 1989, only 26% of 
the defendants of insider trading cases are actually officers and directors.  Meulbroek (1992) 
reports 24% for employees using cases prosecuted by SEC for the same period.  Second, corporate 
insiders might intentionally choose not to disclose illegal trading through other means if they are 
illegal, which would underestimate the extent of the problem. Therefore, results relying on legal 
filing data might fail to provide a complete picture of the actual insider trading practices. 
Moreover, Seyhun’s analysis is based on the data between 1975 and 1986. The market conditions, 
regulation and enforcement have experienced a lot of changes over the years, making it worthwhile 
to revisit this issue. With that in mind, a general study using recent data, which is aimed to 
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 A non-corporate insider is anyone who has material private information of one issuer and has no legal obligation to 
report his trading in that stock, such as analysts, lawyers, friends or relatives of insiders. 
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systematically examine the stock performance and trading activities, is able to provide a better 
understanding of the overall insider trading activities in the stocks of takeover bidders.  
 
2.2. Stylized Facts on Announcement Returns of Acquirer Stock 
 
 To understand the ways in which acquirer share prices might move in advance of a takeover 
announcement, in this section we review stylized facts from the literature on announcement return 
associated with acquirer stock.  This literature shows that merger and acquisition generate 
predictable movements in acquirer stock price depending on the characteristics of the target, the 
acquirer and the nature of the acquisition.  The Appendix of this paper concisely summarizes this 
literature in Tabular form. 
 
2.2.1. Private Acquisitions 
 
Whether the target firm is private or public potentially has a significant impact on acquirer 
announcement returns. Empirical studies of merger and acquisition usually focus on very short-run 
market reaction to news announcement,3 with the underlying assumption that stock markets are 
informationally efficient and the market reacts correctly to the news. In general, these studies show 
that firms acquiring private targets outperform those taking over public firm over the short period 
around announcement. One explanation for this phenomenon is that private firms are harder to value 
and face an illiquidity discount, so the acquirer pays less and the announcement return is often 
positive for a private acquisition (Fuller et al., 2002; Faccio et al, 2007; Officer, 2008). Capron and 
Shen (2007) confirm the finding using a unique survey data and a two-stage model to control for the 
endogeneity of choice of target.  
 
There are other studies, however, that suggest underperformance associated with private 
acquisitions.  From information asymmetry perspective, there is substantially more information 
asymmetry about the takeover itself and the private target’s value compared to public-target 
acquisition, because privately held companies are more opaque than publicly traded companies.  
Private firms do not have to publish their financial statements and have scant analyst following and 
disclose requirements, which makes it difficult for the retail investors to acquire any information 
about a private target.  Acquisitions of private firms are often carried out with the view towards 
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 Most papers consider 2 to 5 days CARs (Chang, 1998; Kohers and Ang, 2000; Conn, Cosh, Guest, and Hughes, 2001; 
Fuller et al, 2002; Masulis and Nahata, 2009 ) 
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avoiding disclosure requirements with an IPO (Carpentier et al., 2008).  Agrawal et al. (1992) find a 
negative and significant relation between the market reaction to the announcement and the 
subsequent performance of the firm. However, they find that this relation is not persistent over 
their entire sample period. Loughran and Vijh (1997) examine the post-announcement returns and 
argue that markets systematically overestimate or underestimate the efficiency gains from 
acquisitions. André, Kooli, and L’Her (2004) find that Canadian acquirers significantly 
underperform over the three-year post-event period, and perform particularly worse for equity 
financed deals and cross-border deals.  Further, they note that the long-term negative abnormal 
returns may be explained by a slow adjustment to the acquisition announcement.  
 
The long term underperformance is consistent with recent findings in Maksimovic et al. 
(2009), who examine productivity differences between private and public acquisitions.  They show 
better firms select to become public and participate more in productivity increasing mergers. This 
evidence of lower productivity of privately held firms implies underperformance of the acquirer 
post announcement for the typical private acquisition. 
 
In short, there is literature showing both positive and negative returns to acquirers post 
announcement of private acquisitions.  This implies that it is worth examining potential 
heterogeneity within the class of private acquisitions in our empirical analysis below. 
 
2.2.2. Transaction Risks 
 
Transaction risks are potentially exacerbated for diversifying acquisitions, where there is 
greater leverage, and when the acquirer’s equity is overvalued.  An acquisition of a firm in a 
dissimilar industry (‘a diversifying transaction’) will have exacerbated risks if the acquirer’s 
managers are outside of their scope of expertise and ability to accurately value the target and target’s 
industry.  
 
A large literature has considered whether diversifying acquisitions are associated with bidder 
agency problems. The agency theory of diversification suggests lower true value improvements, and 
especially lower bidder returns, in cross-industry transactions than in same-industry transactions.  
Prior evidence is consistent with the view that diversifying transactions are associated with lower 
bidder returns. Focusing on 260 pure stock-for-stock mergers from 1963 to 1996, Maquieira et al. 
(1998) provide evidence that conglomerate bidding-firm stockholders lose but all other security 
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holders at least break even. Moeller (2004) examines the takeover announcement using a list of 
12,023 acquisitions by U.S. public firms from 1980 to 2001. Among other things, Moeller finds that 
the market reacts negatively to an acquirer bidding for a target in the different industry, which is 
robust to a number of models. Similar findings are presented by Bhagat et al (2005), who analyze a 
comprehensive sample of U.S. tender offers during 1962–2001 and find that bidders earn positive 
CARs when acquiring a target of the same industry. 
 
Transaction risks are also more pronounced among more highly leveraged acquirers.  It is 
difficult to assess the effect of leverage, as it is potentially non-linear.  Leverage may have positive 
value in some contexts or for certain ranges.  For instance, Maloney et al. (1993) find that bidders 
with higher leverage are able to make better acquisitions; but excessive leverage may bring about 
agency problems and increase the risk of liquidation.   
 
2.2.3. Cross-Border Acquisitions 
 
Compared to domestic acquisition, cross-border takeover bids are more complex since it 
usually involves the handling of a significant number of legal entities, listed or not, and which are 
often governed by local rules (company law, market regulations, self regulations), which might 
translate into legal incompatibilities. As an example, Sarbanes Oxley legislation after June 2002 
exacerbates the costs of acquiring U.S. companies (Falis and Eaton, 2004).  As well, after an 
acquisition is completed, there may be impediments to effective integration while being exposed to 
disproportionate transaction costs, thereby reducing the synergistic gain. 
 
Prior work shows bidder returns differ across domestic versus international targets. Black, 
Carnes, and Jandik (2001) find significant negative returns to US bidders during the three and five 
years following cross-border mergers. Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu, and Zulehner (2003) confirm the 
post-acquisition underperformance for cross-border acquisitions using international data, though 
Conn, Cosh, Guest, and Hughes (2001) do not find any evidence of post-acquisition negative returns 
for cross-border acquisitions in U.K acquisition context. Fumagalli and Vasconcelos (2009) find that 
cross-border mergers are significantly influenced by regulatory costs. Though they focus on post-
M&A performance, André, Kooli, and L'Her (2004) investigate a list of Canadian takeover during 
the 1980-2002 period and find that compared to domestic mergers, cross-board deals perform 
poorly in the long term. Finally, Differences in gains from domestic and cross-border takeovers are 
presented in Eckbo and Thorburn (2000). Eckbo and Thorburn compare the performance of U.S. 
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and Canadian bidders which successfully acquired Canadian targets during the 1964-1983 periods. 
They find that domestic acquisition is associated with positive gains, while U.S. bidder’s return is 
indistinguishable from zero.   
 
In short, prior work consistently shows announcement CARs to be lower for foreign 
targets.  Runup CARs that are significantly negative therefore are suggestive of insider trading and 
would warrant further investigation. 
  
2.2.4. Payment Method 
 
A large numbers of literature discuss the impact of choice of method of payment on 
acquisition announcement returns.  Myers and Majluf (1984) model stock payment and 
demonstrate that firms believe their equity is overvalued when they pay by stock. Knowing that, 
target shareholders tend not to accept stock. Therefore, signaling theory suggests that higher-
valued bidders will use cash or higher proportion of cash to signal their value to the market 
(Fishman, 1989; Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1990; Eckbo at el, 1990).  
 
Hansen (1998) and Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) address the choice of method of payment 
in the target valuation uncertainty context. They suggest that bidders make stock offers when they 
are uncertain about targets’ value due to the risk sharing by target shareholders.   
 
Empirical evidence provides supports to the overvaluation theory as takeovers financed by 
cash have greater announcement CAR than do those paid by stock (Travlos, 1987; Fishman, 1989; 
Martin 1996; Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Fuller at al. 2002). Martin (1996) shows that, in the case of 
bidder uncertainty, shares are more likely to be chosen as method of payment. Chang (1998) and 
Fuller at al. (2002) provide evidence that stock offers overperform cash offers in the acquisition of 
private firms.  
 
In sum, the literature consistently shows announcement CARs  are lower for share 
payment.  Runup CARs that are significantly negative for share acquisitions are in effect highly 
suggestive of insider trading and warrant further investigation. 
 




Venture capitalists extensively screen the companies in which they invest, facilitate 
professionalization of the firm, and certify the quality of the firm to the new owners.  Empirical 
evidence confirms the fact that VC-backed acquisitions have significantly positive announcement 
returns (Masulis and Nahata, 2009).  Regulators therefore have reason to suspect insider trading in 




This section reviewed literature that consistently shows announcement returns are relatively more 
predictable for private targets, VC-backed targets, foreign targets, riskier acquirers, and share 
payment acquisitions.  The predictability of market reaction to takeover depending on the factors 
discussed above makes it possible for insider to profit from his material non-public information by 
purchasing or selling the acquior’s stock when expected market reaction is negative or positive, 
causing abnormal price increase or drop. Therefore, if insider trading has occurred, we will expect 
to observe a link between runup CARs and deal features.  In the next section, we empirically test 
the proposition that runup CARs matches such expected post-announcement acquirer returns. 
 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
 
3.1 Data and variables 
 
We collected from the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions 
Database a list of mergers and takeover announcements, in which the acquirer is a public Canadian 
company listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX), with the announcement date between 
January 1991 and December 2008. Leveraged buyouts, spinoffs, recapitalizations, self-tenders, 
exchange offers, repurchases, minority stake purchases, and privatizations are excluded from our 
sample. We also manually check and adjust the announcement day of each transaction using the 
news from Lexis-Nexis.  
 
In order to consider acquisitions with sufficient data, announcements of deals are included 
in the sample if the deal value is more than $CAN 1 million, the acquiring firm is listed on the 
TSX-Canadian Financial Markets Research Centre (TSX-CFMRC) Summary Information 
Database, the acquiring firm is not financial or utility firm, the target is either a public firm or a 
private firm, the acquiring firm acquires (or attempts to acquire) at least 50% of the target firm 
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share, and the deal value is not smaller than 1% of the market value of the acquirer.  If the acquirer 
made two takeover attempts in less than 90 days, the second attempt is excluded from our sample. 
Following the merger and acquisition literature, we also exclude financial and utility firms from 
our sample. Finally, following Chang (1998), Ang and Kohers (2001), and Bouwman et al. (2009), 
Following Chang (1998),  Ang and Kohers (2001), Bouwman and Fuller and Nain (2009), we 
exclude acquisitions of subsidiaries from our sample. We note that while we did not select on 
successful versus unsuccessful deals, only 6 announced deals were unsuccessful in our dataset.  
 
The definitions of the variables used in the analyses are provided in Table 1. The pre-
announcement cumulative abnormal return for each acquirer is calculated over the window of -40 
to -2 trading day prior to the takeover announcement. Daily abnormal return is computed using a 
market model. The estimation period is [-250, -70] trading days and the CFMRC equal-weighted 
index is used to proxy for market return.4  To estimate the market model, we require that there 
must be no less than 50 non-missing returns during the estimation period. Our sample screening 
procedure yields a final sample of 736 mergers and acquisitions, including 273 public targets and 
497 private targets.  Cumulative abnormal transactions are computed as the difference between the 
actual daily transactions and the average daily transactions over the estimation period.  
 
-- Table 1 About Here -- 
 
Financial information needed to calculate acquirer characteristics such as leverage is 
obtained from COMPUSTAT, and Thomson DATASTREAM data are used if the acquirer is not 
covered by COMPUSTAT.  
 
The institutional holding data is obtained from Thomson Reuters Investment Company 
Common Stock Holdings Databases (CDA/Spectrum S34) through Wharton Research Data 
Services. The institutional investors are defined as registered investment companies and 
professional money managers. There is a major difference in the institutional holding data between 
our sample and that in Ferreira et al (2009). Ferreira et al acquire the data from FactSet LionShares 
Global Ownership database, which has much wider coverage of global institutional investors. 
However Thomson Reuters CDA/Spectrum S34 concentrates on U.S. securities, with a limited set 
of non-U.S. securities. As a result, the number in our sample is likely to be downward biased. The 
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 We also estimated CAR using CFMRC value-weighted and TSX Composite index and the results are similar.  
Likewise, we considered other variants of the market model.  For conciseness, the results are not reported here but are 
available on request. 
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simple statistics shows that, in our sample, 78.99% of all institutional investors are from U.S. We 
consider three measures to capture institutional holding: (1) the number of institutional investors, 
(2) the percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional investors,5 and (3) a dummy variable 
equal to one if the bidder has at least one institutional investor from the same country as its target. 
Institutional investors have a non-arm’s length relation with local firms, which transfers into 
information advantage in the cross-country acquisition setting. Institutional holdings especially 
matter for acquisitions of private targets since having the same physical location makes it easier for 
institutional investors to obtain more information through non public channels.   
 
Institutional holding has been widely used as a proxy for information asymmetry.6  It is 
generally agreed that institutional investors are better informed because of their superior access to 
private information as well as their better resource and lower average costs to acquire information. 
Furthermore, institutions are more efficient in processing information and trade more efficiently 
compared to retail investors. Extant evidence has shown that institutional trading is positively 
associated with the information contained in earnings announcement (Seppi, 1992). Chakravarty 
(2001) argues that trades initiated by institutions are more informed and have a larger cumulative 
price impact. In the acquisition setting, greater Institutional holdings imply the information about 
the takeover is more likely to be known before the official announcement, and as such, there is a 
higher chance of information leakage and trading on private information.  
 
In addition to institutional investor coverage, we use another proxy for information 
asymmetry suggested by Masulis and Korwar (1986) (see also Hudson et al, 1993), which is 
defined as defined as the standard deviation of market-model residuals measured over the [-250, -
70] event window.  Greater variation in estimates of the market model means there is more 
idiosyncratic risk associated with the firm.  Idiosyncratic risk is associated with more pronounced 
information asymmetry, and as such, estimates of the standard deviation of the market model are 
expected to be associated with runup CARs.  Of course, other factors might proxy for information 
asymmetry, including the size of the acquirer and the relative size of the target.  These proxies and 
various other controls are considered in our empirical tests.   
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 This second variable is highly correlated with the first, and as such, they were considered separately.  The findings are 
robust to using either variable.  Below, we briefly discuss the percentage of institutional holdings but focus the analysis 
on the number of holders.  We note that 35% of the data for these variables were missing (although not for the other 
variables); we used Stata`s procedure to infer missing values.  The results in this paper are robust to various inference 
methods, and to excluding institutional holdings from the multivariate analysis altogether. 
6
 Jiambalvo et al (2002), O’Neill and Swisher(2003) test both the number of institutional holders and percentage 




We include year dummy variables into our analysis to account for changing economic and 
institutional conditions over time.7 To account for the industry effects, we also create bidder 
industry dummies based on two-digit SIC code. Following Fuller et al. (2002), we introduce a 
diversifying dummy, which is set to 1 if both the acquirer and target firm have the same 3-digit 
SIC code.  
 
Masulis and Nahata (2009) provide evidence that acquiring VC backing targets leads to 
significantly higher acquirer announcement returns, even after controlling for deal characteristics 
and endogeneity in venture.  We introduce a dummy variable VC, which is set to one for target 
firms financed by VC funds, and zero otherwise. The VC financing information is taken from the 
SDC VentureXpert database, which identifies venture investments made by corporate divisions, 
subsidiaries and venture capital funds directly affiliated with corporations.  Only 16 targets in our 
sample are VC backed, and as such other detailed variables for different VC characteristics were 
not possible to consider due to a lack of fegrees of freedom. 
 
3.2 Summary statistics and comparison tests 
 
Table 2 Panel A provides summary statistics of both the dependent and independent 
variables used in our analysis. For all observations in the data, the runup CAR equal weighted over 
the window [-40, -2] is negatively significant, with an average of -1.52%, ranging from -51.0% to 
44.71%, and the median is -0.56%. The CAR value weighted and CAR composite are not very 
different from the equal weighted CAR, with an average of -1.51% and -1.46%, respectively, both 
significant lower than zero.  The CAR value weighted and CAR composite CAR medians are 
trivially different from that CAR equal weighted, with a value of 0.58% and 0.28%, 
respectively.The mean and median cumulative abnormal transactions are 1499 and 99, 
respectively, and both are significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
 
-- Table 2 About Here -- 
 
                                               
7
 The passage of Sarbanes Oxley Act in June 2002 increased the costs associated with acquiring U.S. companies, 
particularly U.S. public companies, making it worthwhile to consider a specific dummy variable for Sarbanes Oxley for 
post June 2002, but that variable did not change any results.  Note that we considered insider trading rules for the target 
firm country, such as those from Beny (2005) and Bris (2005), and surveillance data from Cumming and Johan (2008) 
and Cumming et al. (2009), but those factors were immaterial to our analysis.  The insignificance of these rules likely 
reflects the fact that rules are most important for the acquirer country, and all acquirers in our data are based in Canada. 
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In our sample, 63.3% of the targets are private firms. The majority of the targets are 
Canadian firms, consisting of 62.1% of the sample. U.S. targets comprise a significant portion of 
our sample, equal to 26.6% of the targets, while the other countries comprise 11.3%. Table 2 Panel 
B presents the details of target nationality. 
 
Among all bidders covered by Thomson Reuters CDA/Spectrum S34, the average number 
of institutional investors is 22, ranging from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 416.  The median, 
2, shows that the distribution of the number of institutional investors is highly skewed. The 
percentage institutional holding exhibits similar property, which averages at 10.4%, and ranges 
between 0 and 94.1%. Comparison of the nationality of target firm and that of its associated 
bidder’s institutional investors shows that 23.8% of the target firms have at least one institutional 
investor from the same country. 
 
There are 42.5% of targets which are not in the same industry as the acquirer. The average 
standard deviation of market-model residuals is 0.029.  The average leverage of the acquirers is 
1.487, with a minimum of 0.032 and a maximum of 24.186. On average, the target is about 20.4% 
of the acquirer in terms of size. The data show 51.6% of the acquisitions are paid by cash only, 
compared to 20.2% for stock payment only and 34.9% for mixed payment.  
 
Although the runup CAR appears significantly negative for the overall sample, the 
partition of the sample by different measures including target type, country and method of payment 
reveals a different picture. Figure 1 presents the pre- announcement CAR over the window [-40, 
+30]  for firm acquiring Canadian targets by method of payment from which we observe that the 
method of payment plays an important role in the determination of firms performance prior to and 
after the takeover announcement. Cash offer shows a positive price pre-runup before the formal 
announcement of the takeover deal, which is followed by a big increase during the announcement 
period ([-1, 1] day window) and then stabilizes over the following month. On the contrary, we do 
not see any abnormal price movement for stock offer prior to the announcement. For mixed offer, 
the price seems to follow random walk until about 10 days prior to the announcement, and since 
then it shows a sharp increase over the following the period. Further dividing the sample into 
public and private target groups demonstrates that the above patterns are mainly driven by the 
public target group. Similar patters emerge in Figure 2 for Canadian public targets groups. 
Compared to the whole Canadian target group, the Canadian Public target group shows even 
bigger increase in equity price prior to the announcement when cash is only method of payment, 
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while there is no big change in price during the 3-day announcement period as well as the 
following one month period. Similar to Figure 1, the stock offer does not present abnormal pattern 
before the announcement, which also exists for the mixed offer. Though not reported here, we plot 
the same chart for Canadian firms acquiring private targets, in which we do not see any significant 
pre-announcement price movement for either method of payment group. To summarize, for 
Canadian targets, the possible information leakage is likely to happen when acquirers use cash to 
purchase target firm, which is even more likely when the target is a listed firms.  
 
The U.S. target sample experiences different patents. Figure 3 presents the Canadian 
acquirers taking over U.S. targets by method of payment. Both cash and mixed offer see 
continuous abnormal price drop over the period from -40 to -2 days, which then increases around 
the announcement but quickly reverses and continue dropping from the 2nd day after the 
announcement and continues dropping until 30 days after the announcement. Overall, the acquirer 
stock lost value during the 70 day period. This might suggest that acquirers engaging in pure stock 
offer observe a lot of variation in its stock price, but in general, there is no significant price change 
during the pre-announcement period. The U.S. private target, however, shows a different picture 
(Figure 4). Stock offer experiences consistent price drop along the time, suggesting possible 
incidences of information leakage. On the contrary, cash and mixed offer see no obvious increase 
or drop before the takeover news becomes publicly available.  
 
In subsection 2.2 above, we considered literature that suggested both positive and negative 
effects with private acquisitions.  As such, in Figure 5 we report CARs for quintiles sorted by 
announcement return.  The data in Figure 5 indicate that on average there is a positive 
announcement effect for private acquisitions, but the 30-day post-announcement return is 
significantly negative.  There is massive heterogeneity in announcement returns for acquirers of 
private firms.  On average, announcement returns are positive due to the performance of the top 
quintile, but the other quintiles show substantially lower and often negative announcement returns to 
private acquisitions.   
 
Figure 6 illustrates the price performance for firms acquiring VC sponsored targets. 
Consistent with Masulis and Nahata (2009), we see the acquirers experience substantial price 
increase around the announcement.  Furthermore, the acquirers also experience price runup starting 
about 23 days prior to the announcement day, suggesting the possibility that insiders acts on their 
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private information about the pending acquisition and act on it to benefit themselves before the 
public is aware of the news.  
 
-- Figures 1-6 About Here -- 
 
The phenomenon depicted in the graphs is confirmed by the statistics in Table 3. In the 
Canadian public target sample, the cash offer acquisition experiences an average of 4.02% 
cumulative abnormal returns before the takeover announcement, which is both economically and 
statistically significant. However, the announcement return for this group is as small as 0.10%, no 
different from zero. In contrast, on average,  stock offer only sees an insignificant CAR of 0.69% 
prior to the announcement, followed by a significant abnormal price drop of -1.78% around 
announcement. For mixed offer, the pre-announcement averages 2.67%, not statistically different 
from zero. Consistent with the graph, for Canadian firms taking over the U.S. public target, stock 
offer leads to a very significant abnormal price underperformance of -12.29% over the -40 to -2 
window. Some might argue that the result might not be reliable due to the small sample size. 
However, the median CAR Equal Weighted is also as substantial as -11.71%, significant at 10% 
level. Considering that the mean and median announcement CARs are only 1.84% and -0.90%, 
respectively, neither statistically nor economically significant, it is reasonable to say that the stocks 
offer is associated with price drop before announcement.  
 
-- Table 3 About Here -- 
 
Table 4 presents the comparison study by target type. In the full sample, private targets 
experience an average runup CARs of -3.3%, which is both economically and statistically 
significant. In contrast, the public-target acquisition observes insignificant runup CARs equal to 
1.5%.  The results are similar if either CFMRC value-weighted and TSX Composite index is used 
as a proxy for market return. Furthermore, the mean and median comparison test confirm that 
takeover involving a private target has more negative pre- runup, both significant at 1% level, 
regardless of the choice of market return. The findings are consistent with the hypothesis that, 
comparing to acquiring a public target, insiders involved in private target acquisition deals possess 
more material non-public information, which translates into more significant price change in 
acquirers stock if they trade on it. The mean cumulative abnormal transaction is equal to 2441.91 
for public-target acquisition, highly significant. Moreover, compared to private-targets, public-
targets experience a much greater number of transactions before takeover announcement.  
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However, the median cumulative abnormal transaction of both private-target and public-target are 
indistinguishable. These statistics might suggest that the phenomenon is driven by highly liquid 
stocks. A possible explanation is that acquirers of public targets are usually larger than acquirers of 
private targets (Table 4 Panel B), and larger firm is usually more liquid and thus shows a greater 
number of transactions.  
 
-- Table 4 About Here -- 
 
We carried out separate comparison tests pertinent to other variables related to information 
asymmetry.  First, to examine whether the number of institutional investors matters for pre- 
announcement CARs, we divided the sample into two groups in terms of whether the number of 
institutional investors of the acquirer is larger or smaller than the sample median. However, there is 
no significant difference of CAR between the high and low groups.  Second, we repeated this 
exercise for the standard deviation of the market model.  There are differences in medians such that 
higher standard deviation is associated with significantly lower runup CARs, but differences in 
means are not significant.  These comparison tests are available on request. 
 
Empirical studies show a link between firm and deal characteristics and takeover 
announcement returns. We will observe the relationship between the characteristics and pre-
announcement price change, if it is due to insider trading since insiders will be able to predict 
market reaction and act on it. Our comparison tests show that acquirers experience significantly 
larger pre-announcement price drop if they are engaged in a diversifying acquisition (not explicitly 
reported for reasons of conciseness. 
 
Table 5 tests whether cross-border acquisitions are associated with pronounced negative 
runup CARs, considering that acquiring a foreign firm involves higher regulatory risks.  Canadian 
acquirers experience abnormal price drop of about 3-5% before the takeover announcement when 
they are engaged in acquisition of a foreign target, regardless of its nationality. In contrast, 
acquiring a Canadian target is associated with about 1% runup CARs.  The comparison test shows 
that there exists significant difference between domestic and foreign acquisitions, regardless of the 
measures used for equal weighted, value-weighted or composite CARs.   Note, however, there are 
no significant differences in means or medians in terms of cumulative abnormal transactions for 




-- Table 5 About Here -- 
 
As discussed in subsection 2.4, studies show significant market reactions to takeobver 
announcement that depends on the method of payment. In our full sample the data indicate that, on 
average, stock and mixed payment are associated with negative CARs Equal Weighted, which are -
3.10% and -2.30%, respectively, and both significantly at 10% level. The runup CARs for cash 
offers is 2.70% (1.9%) less than that of stock offer (mixed offer), though indistinguishable from 
zero. Since the literature shows that acquirer performance is also affected by factors other than 
method of payment (Table 6 confirms the correlation between those factors), we repeat the test by 
further dividing the sample by target country and target type to explore whether the method of 
payment matters within the sample. For Canadian private-target acquisition, not only stock offer is 
associated with substantially negative runup CAR (-10.52%), but it is significant lower than those 
of cash and mixed payment. As for Canadian public-target takeover, consistent with Figure 2, cash 
offer experiences a significant abnormal price increase of 4.02% over the -40 to -2 day window. 
Likewise, U.S. public-target takeover when stock is used as method of payment sees a risk-
adjusted cumulative return of 12.29% prior to the announcement (consistent with Figure 4). 
 
Table 6 presents a correlation matrix for the main variables used in the multivariate tests 
provided in the next section.  The correlations are consistent with the discussion in section 2 and 
the comparison tests discussed above.  Note as well the data indicate collinearity issues for some of 
the explanatory variables.  For example, U.S.-targets are highly correlated to dummy variable 
Institutional investors Same Country, which can be explained by the high concentration of 
institutional investor in the U.S. Log Asset is highly negatively correlated to standard deviation of 
market model, which makes sense since there is less information asymmetry about larger firms due 
to more prevalent media and analyst coverage.  In the multivariate analyses immediately below, we 
exclude variables in the same regressions with these types of collinearity problems. 
 
-- Table 6 About Here -- 
 
4. Regression Analyses 
 
This section presents multivariate tests of our hypotheses controlling for various economic 
and institutional determinants of the pre-announcement return. For each regression, we control for 
both year and industry effects using dummy variables.  We two-way cluster standard errors by both 
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year and bidder (Petersen, 2009). Table 7 presents our main regressions of CAR Equal Weighted 
(relative to equal weighted index), in which we explore the relation between various information 
asymmetry, risk and regulatory measures and pre-announcement. We also repeat the exercise on 
CAR Value Weighted and CAR Composite as robustness checks, and provide complementary 
evidence on Cumulative Abnormal Transactions (each defined in Table 1).   
 
-- Table 7 About Here -- 
 
Thirteen models are presented in Table 7 to show robustness to alternative specifications.  
Models 1 and 2 in Table 7 use the full sample and consider alternative explanatory variables.  
Model 3 also uses the full sample of all acquisitions.  Model 3 differs from Models 1 and 2 by 
treating the decision to acquire a public versus a private firm as a decision variable with a 
treatment regression.  The first-step equation is a probit regression where the dependent variable is 
equal to 1 for US private targets paid with stock (that is, treating each as a joint choice variable) 
and 0 otherwise.  This first step decision is a function of the standard deviation of the market 
model, Tobin’s Q, and assets, as well as industry and year dummy variables.8  In the second step, 
we employ variables similar to those reported in Model 1.  Models 4 and 5 are single step models 
which consider the subsample for public targets and private targets separately.  Models 6, 7 and 8 
consider the subsamples for Canadian targets, Canadian public targets, and Canadian private 
targets, respectively.  Models 9 and 10 consider the subsamples of U.S. targets and non-Canadian 
and non-U.S. targets.  Models 11, 12 and 13 consider the subsamples of shares, mixed and cash 
only payments. 
 
The coefficient for private targets in Model 1 is negative and significant at 1% level, 
indicating that within the 40 days prior to takeover announcement, the bidder price drops by 4.5% 
for private targets relative to public targets.  This evidence is consistent with the negative post-
announcement returns for private acquisitions depicted in Figure 4.  Figure 5 highlights the fact 
that post announcement returns for private acquisitions are highly heterogeneous.  We ran separate 
regressions for runup CARs (not reported in Table 7 but available on request) for quintiles ranked 
by announcement day return.  These regressions indicate the same negative and statistically 
significant effect of private acquisitions and very similar economic significance for all quintiles, 
                                               
8
 We also estimated Step 1 of Model 3 by including the U.S. and Other Country dummies in the first stage regression.  
Those coefficients were positive and significant, and the Inverse Mills Ratio becomes significant.  But regardless, the 
inclusion or exclusion of these and other variables does not affect the other reported results for either Step 1 or Step 2 of 
Model 3.  Alternative specifications are available on request. 
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with the sole exception of the top quintile which yielded a statistically insignificant coefficient for 
private targets, consistent with Figure 5. 
 
While private targets exhibit significantly negative runup CARs, VC-backed private 
acquisitions experience positive and significant pre-run-up CARs.  In Model 1 the effect is 
significant at the 10% level, and the economic significance is such that CARs of VC-backed 
targets are 10% larger than non-VC-backed targets.  This finding is consistent with the post 
announcement return depicted in Figure 6, and likewise consistent with prior evidence (Masulis 
and Nahata, 2009). 
 
There is some evidence of the importance of information asymmetry from the standard 
deviation of the market model in Model 1.  The effect is negative and significant, as expected, and 
the economic significance is such that a 1-standard deviation increase in the standard deviation 
reduces runup CARs by 2% (although this effect is insignificant in Model 2).  The number of 
institutional holders of the acquirer similarly has the expected sign, but the effect is statistically 
insignificant.  We further investigated whether percentage holdings by institutional investors 
explained the variation of runup CARs, but that variable is likewise insignificant and therefore not 
reported.  In Models 1 and 2, firm specific risk factors such as diversifying or leverage have the 
expected sign but are statistically insignificant.9   
 
Tobin’s Q is significantly negatively associated with runup CARs in Models 1 and 2.  A 
negative sign for Tobin’s q may reflect insiders’ belief that their equity is overvalued, and as such 
lower the runup CARs.  It is similarly possible that agency problems of overvalued equity lead 
insiders make less than value-maximizing acquisitions (Jensen, 2005). The economic significance 
of the effect is such that a 1-standard deviation increase in Tobin’s q reduces runup CARs by 3%. 
 
Since cross-border mergers are significantly influenced by regulatory costs, we expect 
negative coefficients for the U.S. and other countries dummy variables. Both the U.S. and other 
country dummies are negative, as expected, but only the U.S. country dummy variable is 
significant (and at the 5% level).  In Model 1, relative to a domestic takeover, a Canadian acquirer 
will see its stock price underperform by 3.7% pre-announcement of the takeover when it is 
engaged in acquiring a U.S. target.  
 
                                               
9
 We did not uncover nonlinear specifications for leverage that were arguably superior to the specifications reported. 
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Model 1 shows share and mixed payments are associated with significantly lower runup 
CARs (at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively).  Share payments are associated with lower runup 
CARs by 4.9%, while mixed payments are associated with 2.3% lower CARs.  These findings are 
consistent with Myers and Majluf (1984). 
 
Model 2 includes interaction terms for private targets with target country as well as private 
targets with method of payment.  Consistent with expectations, we see foreign private acquisitions 
exhibit stronger and statistically significant price declines.  CARs for U.S. private targets decline 
by 4.4%, and this effect is significant at the 1% level.  CARs for other country private targets 
decline by 4.9%, and this effect is significant at the 10% level.  Further, Model 2 includes terms 
that interacts private targets with share payments and mixed payments.  The evidence shows shares 
* private is negative and significant at the 5% level, with the economic significance at a reduction 
of 7% in CARs. 
 
To summarize, Models 1 and 2 provide strong support for the proposition that predictable 
movements in acquirer returns post announcement are associated with runup CARs the move in the 
same direction and a statistically and economically significant way.  This is suggestive evidence 
that insider trading is more likely for private targets, for firms with greater information asymmetry 
(proxied by the standard deviation of the market model), higher Tobin’s q, foreign acquisitions, 
and share payments.  
 
Model 3 employs a two-step treatment regression (using the treatreg function in Stata) to 
assess the possibility that selection or endogeneity vis-à-vis the decision to target a private 
company, a foreign company, or the mode of payment.  The first step model shows the standard 
error of the market model is the strongest determinant of acquisition of U.S. private targets with 
shares.  Various alternative control variables were considered, and all pointed to the significance of 
the standard error of the market model.  The second step of Model 3 shows runup CARs are 21.9% 
lower for share purchases of U.S. private targets even after controlling for the decision to target a 
private U.S. company and pay with shares.   
 
Many of the other variables in the second step of Model 3 are consistent with Model 1.  
VC-backed targets have higher runup CARs, while the standard error of the market model and 
Tobin’s q are both negative and significant at magnitudes similar to that in Models 1 and 2.  Also, 
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note in Model 3 that the leverage of the acquirer is negative and significant at the 10% level, and 
shows that a 1-standard deviation in leverage reduces runup CARs by 7.7%. 
 
Models 4-13 in Table 7 consider a number of different subsets of the sample to assess 
robustness.  Models 4 and 5 are separate regressions for public and private targets, respectively.  
VC-backed targets have a positive and significant impact on runup CARs in Models 4 and 5.  The 
dummy variable for the U.S. is negative and significant at the 5% level in both Models 4 and 5.  
The dummy variable for Other Country is insignificant in Models 4 and 5.  The economic 
significance of these effects is comparable to that reported above for Model 1.  Overall, the 
findings are quite consistent regardless if the target is public or private. 
 
Table 7 reports the results of regressions for different target country sub-samples for 
Canada in Models 6-8, the U.S. in Model 9 and other countries in Model 10.  We consider 
Canadian public and private targets separately as there are a larger number of Canadian 
transactions to examine these subsamples.  Private targets have a negative and significant effect at 
the 1% level on runup CARs in Model 6, such that CARs are 4.3% lower.  This effect is similarly 
negative in Models 9 and 10, albeit statistically insignificant.  The standard error of the market 
model is negative and significant in Model 6, but not Models 7-10.  Tobin’s q is negative and 
significant in Models 6, 8 and 10.  Share payments are negative and statistically significant in 
Models 6-9, but insignificant in Model 10.  One explanation for this latter result is that share 
payments better ensure the transacting parties keep a vested interest in the success of the 
transaction.  It is possible that for international acquisitions, the need to mitigate this type of 
agency problem is more pronounced, thereby leading insiders to favor share payments.  By 
contrast, VC-backed targets are positive and significant in Model 10, but not Models 6, 8 and 9, 
which suggests that VC’s play a more pronounced certification role in non-North American 
targets.  Further, diversifying transactions have a negative and significant coefficient in Model 10 
for other country targets, where CARs are reduced by 13.6%, suggesting that insiders fear more 
targets that are not in the area of interest when such targets are not based in North America.   
 
Models 11-13 investigate whether the impact of our variables of interest for samples 
constructed by method of payments.  The results in Models 11-13 show the importance of country 
effects, at least for the US in Models 11 and for share payments and Model 12 for mixed payments.  
We note that the presence of institutional investors improves CARs for cash-only transactions in 
Model 13, which is consistent with their role in mitigating information asymmetries, but the effect 
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is small (a 1-standard deviation change impacts CARs by 1.6%).  As well for the subsample of 
cash payments in Model 13, the data highlight the importance of private targets, VC-backed 
targets, and Tobin’s Q.  In Model 13, runup CARs are 4.4% lower for private acquisitions, 11.9% 
higher for VC-backed targets, and a 1-standard deviation increase in Tobin’s Q reduces CARs by 
3.2%.  The data suggest that cash payments are relatively riskier transactions, thereby exacerbating 
the effect of deal-specific factors.   
 
Table 8 presents robustness checks for different dependent variables.  We do not repeat all 
of the specifications in Table 7, but rather present a few models to highlight the most important 
effects.  Models 14 and 15 use the value-weighted CARs and composite CARs as dependent 
variables, respectively, while Model 16 uses cumulative abnormal transactions.10   
 
-- Table 8 About Here -- 
 
 Models 14 and 15 both highlight significantly negative runup CARs for private targets, 
and for acquirers with a greater standard deviation of the market model and greater Tobin’s q.  
This evidence is highly consistent with the evidence in Table 7 for equal-weighted CARs in terms 
of both economic and statistical significance.   
 
The cumulative transactions in Model 16 are significantly negatively influenced by private 
acquisitions, and significantly positively influenced by Tobin’s Q, and asset size of the acquirer.  A 
one-standard deviation increase in the size of the acquirer from the average size increases 
cumulative abnormal transactions only by 10.  By comparison, private acquisitions are associated 
with 758 fewer abnormal transactions, which is roughly 13% of one standard deviation of the 
cumulative abnormal transactions (Table 2).  This result suggests that on average private 
acquisitions are less likely to be known than public acquisitions.  A one-standard deviation 
increase in Tobin’s Q increases cumulative abnormal transactions by 1247, consistent with the idea 
that insiders are likely to trade pre-announcement where risks are more pronounced.  Finally, a 
one-standard deviation increase in log assets increases cumulative abnormal transactions by 1707, 
which is intuitive as larger acquirers have less information asymmetry and attract additional 
attention from institutional and other investors.  
 
                                               
10
 We considered other statistics such as turnover (volume per shares outstanding), and inferences drawn were not 





This paper examined for the first time the pre-announcement share price and transaction 
dynamics of acquirers in response to public versus private acquisitions.  The central hypothesis 
tested in this paper is that insider trading potentially exists where pre-announcement CARs 
significantly move in the same direction as expected post-announcement CARs.  We reviewed 
related literature that has established stylized facts regarding the extent to which takeover 
announcement returns are predictable. 
 
We examined 770 Canadian acquirers of targets in Canada, the U.S. and 31 other countries 
around the world over the years 1990-2008.  The Canadian setting is a useful forum by virtue of its 
legal similarity to the U.S., and the propensity of acquirers to acquire both private and public 
companies in Canada and abroad.  The data examined show systematic evidence of insider trading 
actions worthy of investigation depending on the characteristics of the acquirer (including Tobin’s 
q and proxies for information asymmetry), characteristics of the target (including private versus 
public, as well as VC-backing), and method of payment (shares versus cash versus mixed).  In the 
course of our analyses, we showed the these findings to be statistically significant and 
economically large, and robust to 2-step treatment regressions for the non-random choice to target 
a private firm, alternative explanatory variables, different event window lengths, different 
benchmarks to generate CARs, and subsets of the data.   
 
Our findings are consistent with other studies of insider trading and add to the body of 
knowledge by providing unique evidence of insider trading of acquirer stock.  The results have 
policy implications for surveillance authorities.  Insider trading investigations on trades of acquirer 
stock for both public and private targets can be targeted towards announcement transactions that 
generate predictable movements in acquirer share prices.  The findings herein show where insider 





This Appendix presents a review of the literature on post-announcement performance of acquisitions.  Papers, datasets and findings are 
summarized in Table A-1. 
 
 
Table A-1. Summary of Research on Announcement Returns to Acquirer 
  








Countries Description  
Myers and Majluf (1984 
JFE) Share transactions Negative 
Theoretica
l     
This paper develops a model to show that firms' 
financing decision for the purpose of supporting 
investment projects in the information 
asymmetry context. In the M&A context, it 
predicts that cash offer conveys better 
information about the bidders and deal than stock 
offer. 
Travlos (1987 JF) Public + stock Negative Empirical 1972-1981 U.S. 
This paper studies the bidder return related to 
method of payment. It finds out that bidding 
firms suffer significantly losses in pure stock 
exchange acquisitions, but experiences 'normal' 
returns in cash offers. The finding is in 
dependent of mode of payment. 
Lang, Stulz and 
Walkling (1991 JFE) 
High Tobin’s q + 
public target Higher Empirical 
1968-
1980 U.S. 
This paper provides support to Jensen's free cash 
flow theory in a takeover context. It shows that 
more cash flow and low Tobin' Q. which proxies 
for investment opportunity, are associated with 
lower bidder return. 
Servaes (1991JF) High Tobin’s q + public target Higher Empirical 
1972-
1987 U.S. 
This paper analyzes the relation between 
takeover gains and Tobin's q. Both bidder and 
target gain more in the case of higher bidder 
ratios and lower target q ratios, providing support 
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Countries Description  
Maloney, McCormick 
and Mitchell (1993 JB)  Higher leverage Higher Empirical 
1962-
1990 U.S. 
This article investigates leverage influence on 
project selection using merger and acquisition 
data. It finds that higher the leverage increases 
acquirer's announcement-period returns, 
supporting the hypothesis that debt improves 
managerial decision making. 








This paper considers tender offer only. It shows 
that competition between bidders reduce bidder 
gains in general. Singer bidder gains but the 
following bidders engaging in a multiple bidder’s 
acquisition lose. 
Chang (1998 JF) Private target + cash Insignificant 
Empirical 1981-1992 U.S. 
Bidder who acquires a private firm experiences a 
positive (no abnormal) return in stock (cash) 
offer. The author suggests that it is related to the 
monitoring effect by stockholders. 
  Private target + stock Positive 
Eckbo and Thorburn 
(2000 JFQA) Domestic/U.S bidders 
Positive/insig
nificant 
Empirical 1945-1983 U.S., Canada 
This paper studies U.S. and Canadian firms 
bidding for Canadian targets. Domestic takeover 
outperforms cross-board takeover in terms of 
pre- and post- announcement return. For 
domestic bidders, stock offer perform better. 
  
Domestic bidder + 
stock  Higher return 
Kohers and Ang (2000 
JB) 
Takeover during high-
valuation market Higher  Empirical 
1984-
1996 U.S. 
This paper compares quoted and unquoted firms 
and finds out that acquirer shareholders benefit 
for acquiring a private target. But the market's 
reaction depends on the premium paid to the 
target. 
Fuller, Netter and 
Stegemoller (2002 JF) 
Public/non-public Negative / positive 
Empirical 1990-2000 U.S. 
This paper studies firms making five or more 
acquisitions within a short time period. It 
provides evidence that bidders benefit from 
private/subsidiary acquisitions. Acquiring private 
targets with stock performs better than others. 
These results are consist with a liquidity 
discount, and tax and control effects in the 
market 
Public + cash or mix Insignificant 
  Public + stock Negative 
  
(Non-public + stock) - 






Table A-1 (Continued) 








Countries Description  
Moeller, Schlingemann 





This paper discovers the size effect in acquisition 
announcement returns. Overall, small acquirers 
outperform larger acquirers by about 2%. 
Conn, Cosh, Guest and 
Hughes (2005 JBFA) Domestic public target Negative 
Empirical 1984-1998 UK 
The paper examines the announcement as well as 
post-acquisition. In general, cross-board public 
acquisitions overperform domestic public 
acquisition. Private acquisition performs better 
than public acquisition regardless of the location 




  Private target Positive 
Faccio McConnell and 








This paper confirms the existence of listing 
effect in European acquisition, that is, private 
acquisition earn a significant CARs after 
controlling for other factors. 
Capron and Shen (2007 





from U.S., U.K., 
and France 
representing 
77% of bidders. 
It focuses on manufacturing industries. Private 
acquisition performs better even after controlling 
for endogeneity bias using a two-stage model. 
And acquirers of public (private) firms perform 
better than if they has acquired a private (private) 
firm. 
Bouwman, Fuller and 
Rain (2009 NFS) Synergy gain   Empirical 
1979-
2002 U.S. 
This paper examines takeovers happening 
different periods, and finds out that acquiring 
buying during high-valuation markets have 
significantly higher announcement returns and 
lower long-run performance than those buying 
during low-valuation markets, which are due to 
managerial herding. 
Masulis and Nahata 
(2009 JFQA) 
Venture capital backed 
private target Positive Empirical 
1991-
2006 U.S. 
This paper analyzes the effects of VC backing on 
profitability of private firm acquisitions. It finds 
VC backing leads to significantly higher acquirer 
announcement returns, averaging 3%, after 
controlling for other facts, which is due to VCs' 
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Table 1. Definition of Variables 
 
Variable Name Definition 
Dependent Variables  
CAR Equal Weighted Cumulative abnormal return over the window [-40, -2] before takeover announcement. The abnormal return is estimated using market 
model with TSX-CFMRC daily equal weighted index as a proxy of market return. Data source: TSX-Canadian Financial Markets Research 
Centre (TSX-CFMRC). 
CAR Value Weighted Cumulative abnormal return over the window [-40, -2] before takeover announcement. The abnormal return is estimated using market 
model with TSX-CFMRC daily value weighted index as a proxy of market return. Data source: TSX-Canadian Financial Markets Research 
Centre (TSX-CFMRC). 
CAR Composite Cumulative abnormal return over the window [-40, -2] before takeover announcement. The abnormal return is estimated using market 
model with TSX Composite Total Return index as a proxy of market return. Data source: TSX-Canadian Financial Markets Research 
Centre (TSX-CFMRC). 
Cumulative Abnormal Transaction Cumulative abnormal number of transactions over the window [-40, -2] before takeover announcement. The abnormal return is estimated 




Firm Characteristics  
Public Dummy variable equal to 1 if the target firm is a public company, zero for others. Data source: SDC Platinum Mergers & Acquisitions. 
Private Dummy variable equal to 1 if the target firm is a private company, zero for others. Data source: SDC Platinum Mergers & Acquisitions. 
Leverage of acquirer Acquirer's liabilities divided by shareholder equity. Data source: SDC Platinum Mergers & Acquisitions. 
Diversifying Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 2-digit SIC code of the acquirer and target are different. Data source: SDC Platinum Mergers & 
Acquisitions. 
 
Standard Error of Equal Weighted 
Market Model 
The standard deviation of error term of the market model, in which TSX-CFMRC daily equal weighted index is used as a proxy of market 
return. Data source: TSX-Canadian Financial Markets Research Centre (TSX-CFMRC). 
 
Standard Error of Value Weighted 
Market Model 
The standard deviation of error term of the market model, in which TSX-CFMRC daily value weighted index is used as a proxy of market 
return. Data source: TSX-Canadian Financial Markets Research Centre (TSX-CFMRC). Data source: TSX-Canadian Financial Markets 
Research Centre (TSX-CFMRC). 
 
Standard Error of Composite 
Market Model 
The standard deviation of error term of the market model, in which TSX Composite Total Return index is used as a proxy of market return. 
Data source: TSX-Canadian Financial Markets Research Centre (TSX-CFMRC). 
 
Tobin’s Q Acquirer's Tobin's q, which is equal to (market value of shareholder equity + book value of liability)/book value of total asset. Data source: 
TSX-Canadian Financial Markets Research Centre (TSX-CFMRC), DATASTREAM, COMPUSTAT. 
 
Number of Holders Number of institutional investors in the acquirer firm. Data source: CDA/Spectrum S34. 
Percent of Holders The total percentage of holding by institutional investor in the acquirer firms, Data Source: CDA/Spectrum S34. 
Institutional Investors in the Same 
Country 
 




Log of the book value of the assets of the acquirer.  Data source: DATASTREAM, COMPUSTAT. 
Relative size Deal value scaled by the acquirer market value. Data source: TSX-Canadian Financial Markets Research Centre (TSX-CFMRC). 
 
VC A dummy variable equal to 1 if the target firm is financed by a venture capital. Data source: SDC VentureXpert. 
Country Effects  
Canada Dummy variable equal to 1 if the target firm is a Canadian company, zero for others. Data source: SDC Platinum Mergers & Acquisitions. 
 
US Dummy variable equal to 1 if the target firm is a U.S. company, zero for others. Data source: SDC Platinum Mergers & Acquisitions. 
 
Other Country Dummy variable equal to 1 if the target firm is neither a U.S. nor a Canadian company, zero for others. Data source: SDC Platinum 
Mergers & Acquisitions. 
Payment Method  
Stock Dummy variable equal to 1 if the method of payment is pure stock, zero for others. Data source: SDC Platinum Mergers & Acquisitions. 
 
Mixed Dummy variable equal to 1 if the method of payment is a mixture of cash and stock, zero for others. Data source: SDC Platinum Mergers & 
Acquisitions. 
 
Cash Dummy variable equal to 1 if the method of payment is pure cash, zero for others. Data source: SDC Platinum Mergers & Acquisitions. 
Market / Industry Conditions  
Year dummies Dummy variable for announcement years. Data source: SDC Platinum Mergers & Acquisitions. 





Table 2 : Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A provides summary statistics for the main variables in the dataset.  Panel B summarizes the 31 nationalities of the target company; all 
acquirers are based in Canada.  The sample spans the years 1991-2008. 
 
Panel A. Summary Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Dependent Variables       
CAR Equal Weighted 736 -1.52% -0.56% 17.21% -51.90% 44.71% 
CAR Value Weighted 736 -1.51% -0.58% 16.56% -48.69% 45.20% 
CAR Composite 736 -1.46% -0.57% 16.63% -48.58% 46.84% 
Cumulative Abnormal Transactions 736 1499 99 5874 -10286 38292 
Independent Variables       
Firm Characteristics       
Private 736 0.633 1.000 0.482 0.000 1.000 
Public 736 0.367 0.000 0.482 0.000 1.000 
Leverage of acquirer 689 1.487 0.698 3.301 0.032 24.186 
Diversifying 736 0.425 0.000 0.495 0.000 1.000 
Standard Error of Market Model 736 0.029 0.024 0.016 0.008 0.088 
Tobin’s Q 689 2.233 1.586 1.876 0.559 11.682 
Number of Holders 467 22 2 45 1 416 
Percent of Holders 463 10.73% 1.44% 17.64% 0.00% 94.10% 
Institutional Investors in the Same Country 736 0.238 0.000 0.426 0.000 1.000 
Log Assets 691 5.707 5.508 1.846 2.051 11.850 
Relative size 736 0.204 0.102 0.280 0.011 1.626 
VC 736 0.022 0.000 0.146 0.000 1.000 
Country Effects       
Canada 736 0.621 1.000 0.485 0.000 1.000 
US 736 0.266 0.000 0.442 0.000 1.000 
Other Country 736 0.113 0.000 0.317 0.000 1.000 
Payment Method       
Stock 736 0.202 0.000 0.402 0.000 1.000 
Mixed 736 0.281 0.000 0.450 0.000 1.000 







Table 2 (Continued) 
Panel B. Summary statistics of the nationalities of the target 
companies. 
Target Nationality Frequency Percent 
Australia 9 1.22% 
Austria 1 0.14% 
Bahamas 1 0.14% 
Belgium 2 0.27% 
Bermuda 1 0.14% 
Canada 457 62.09% 
Chile 3 0.41% 
China 1 0.14% 
Finland 1 0.14% 
France 5 0.68% 
Germany 7 0.95% 
Gibraltar 1 0.14% 
Guyana 1 0.14% 
Italy 2 0.27% 
Mexico 1 0.14% 
Netherlands 2 0.27% 
New Zealand 1 0.14% 
Nicaragua 1 0.14% 
Norway 1 0.14% 
Papua N Guinea 1 0.14% 
Peru 5 0.68% 
Puerto Rico 1 0.14% 
Russian Fed 1 0.14% 
Singapore 1 0.14% 
South Africa 2 0.27% 
Spain 1 0.14% 
Sweden 1 0.14% 
Switzerland 2 0.27% 
Trinidad & Tobago 1 0.14% 
United Kingdom 25 3.40% 
United States 196 26.63% 





Table 3. Mean and Median Acquirer Pre-announcement and Announcement CARs for Public Canadian and U.S. Targets 
 
This table provides the means and medians for CARs Equal Weighted and announcement CARs for firms acquiring U.S. and Canadian targets by method of 
payment.  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Cash Offer Stock Offer Mixed Offer 














N 61 61 95 95 61 61 
Mean 4.02%** 0.10% 0.69% -1.78%* 2.67% -1.35%* 
Median 1.49% -0.55% 0.19% -2.14% -0.15% -1.03% 
Std Dev 0.157 0.073 0.173 0.082 0.147 0.056 
t-value 2.00 0.11 0.39 -2.12 1.42 -1.88 
U.S. Public 
Target N 24 24 11 11 4 4 
Mean 2.37% 0.49% -12.29%** 1.84% 1.19% -2.07% 
Median 6.57% -0.06% -11.71%* -0.90% 0.60% 0.04% 
Std Dev 0.118 0.050 0.206 0.121 0.083 0.070 
t-value 0.99 0.49 -1.98 0.51 0.29 -0.59 
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Table 4. Comparisons of Mean and Median Acquirer CARs for Public and Private Targets 
 
Panel A provides comparison of means and medians for each of the different dependent variables over the -40 to -2 day window for the 
acquirers as defined in Table 1 and summarized in Table 2 for public versus private targets.  Panel B summarizes various explanatory 
variables depending on the public versus private status of the target.  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Characteristics of Dependent variables depending on public status of target 
 
Variable Statistic Public Targets Private Targets Differences 
  
        
CAR Equal 
Weighted Return 
N 270 466   
Mean 1.50% -0.33% -3.7*** 
Median 0.70% -0.14% p= 0*** 
Standard Deviation 0.16 0.176   
  
        
CAR Value 
Weighted Return 
N 270 466   
Mean 1.00% -2.90% -3.21*** 
Median 0.50% -1.80% p= 0.01*** 
Standard Deviation 0.152 0.171   
  
        
CAR composite 
Return 
N 270 466   
Mean 1.00% -2.90% -3.19*** 
Median 0.60% -1.30% p= 0.01*** 
Standard Deviation 0.152 0.172   
  




N 270 466   
Mean 2441.91 952.26 -2.91*** 
Median 101.01 96.44 p= 0.26 
Standard Deviation 7713.28 4394.13   
          
 
 
Panel B. Characteristics of explanatory variables depending on public status of target 
 
This table summarizes the main variables in the data depending on whether the target was private or publicly held. 
 
 Private Target Public Target Difference Tests P-Values 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Standard Error of Equal Weighted 
Market Model 0.030 0.025 0.026 0.023 3.25*** p= 0.03** 
Canada 52% 100% 80% 100% -8.61*** p= 0*** 
U.S. 34% 0% 14% 0% 6.28*** p= 0*** 
Other Country 15% 0% 5% 0% 4.52*** p= 0*** 
Number of Holders 16.69 2.00 29.83 4.00 -3.04*** p= 0*** 
Relative size 0.15 0.06 0.31 0.18 -6.96*** p= 0*** 
Log Asset 5.36 5.27 6.32 6.09 -6.47*** p= 0*** 
leverage 1.20 0.68 1.99 0.73 -2.62*** p= 0.04** 
Cash 62.02% 100.00% 33.70% 0.00% 7.69*** p= 0*** 
Shares 8.37% 0.00% 40.74% 0.00% -9.93*** p= 0*** 
Mixed 29.61% 0.00% 25.56% 0.00% 1.18 p= 0.24 
Tobin q 2.30 1.59 2.12 1.59 1.23 p= 0.73 








Table 5. Comparison of Mean  and Median Acquirer Cumulative Abnormal Return and Cumulative Abnormal Transaction by Target Country 
 
This table provides comparison of means and medians for each of the acquirer CARs defined in Table 1 and summarized in Table 2 for targets from Canada, US and 
other countries.  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Variable Statistic Canada U.S. Other Country CANADA- U.S. CANADA- Others Others - U.S. 
         
CAR Equal Weighted 
Return 
N 457 196 83    
Mean 1.00% -5.00% -5.00% 3.75*** 2.82*** 0.12 
Median 1.00% -4.00% -5.00% p= 0*** p= 0.01*** p= 0.96 
Standard 
Deviation 0.16 0.19 0.17    
  
       
CAR Value Weighted 
Return 
N 457 196 83    
Mean 0.00% -5.00% -4.00% 3.47*** 2.42** 0.28 
Median 1.00% -3.00% -4.00% p= 0*** p= 0.02** p= 0.79 
Standard 
Deviation 0.16 0.18 0.16    
 
       
CAR Composite Return 
N 457 196 83    
Mean 0.00% -5.00% -4.00% 3.27*** 2.33** 0.22 
Median 1.00% -3.00% -4.00% p= 0*** p= 0.02** p= 0.84 
Standard 
Deviation 0.16 0.18 0.16    
  
       
Cumulative Abnormal 
Transactions 
N 457 196 83    
Mean 1386 1451 2231 -0.14 -0.95 0.81 
Median 70 83 202 p= 0.83 p= 0.29 p= 0.29 
Standard 
Deviation 5405.08 5990.18 7802.42    








Table 6. Correlation Matrix 
This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients for selected variables as defined in Table 1.  Correlations greater than 0.06, 0.07 and 0.10 in absolute value are significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
(1) Equal-Weighted CARs 1.00                 
(2) Value-Weighted CARs 0.93 1.00                
(3) CARs from Composite Index 0.92 1.00 1.00               
(4) Cumulative Abnormal Transactions 0.08 0.09 0.09 1.00              
(5) Private -0.13 -0.11 -0.11 -0.14 1.00             
(6) VC-Backed Target 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.09 1.00            
(7) Leverage 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.13 -0.11 0.01 1.00           
(8) Diversifying -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.05 0.17 -0.01 0.09 1.00          
(9) Standard Error Market Model -0.15 -0.14 -0.13 -0.14 0.10 0.06 -0.17 0.00 1.00         
(10) Tobin’s q -0.19 -0.20 -0.19 0.14 0.04 0.13 -0.16 -0.09 0.23 1.00        
(11) Number of Institutional Holders -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.06 -0.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.09 -0.04 1.00       
(12) Institutional Holders Same Country 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.20 -0.01 0.07 0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.08 0.02 1.00      
(13) Log Assets 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.24 -0.25 0.00 0.53 0.03 -0.57 -0.33 0.05 0.29 1.00     
(14) US -0.13 -0.12 -0.11 -0.01 0.20 0.18 0.04 0.03 0.12 0.11 -0.03 0.39 0.03 1.00    
(15) Other Country -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 0.04 0.14 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 -0.05 -0.20 -0.03 -0.23 1.00   
(16) Pay Stock -0.06 -0.03 -0.02 0.04 -0.38 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.20 0.12 -0.01 0.05 -0.07 -0.10 -0.10 1.00  





Table 7. Regression Analyses of Runup CARs 
This table presents OLS regression analyses of equal weighted CARs of the acquirer firm for -40 days to -2 days prior to acquisition announcement.  Explanatory variables are as defined in Table 1.  Models 1 and 2 consider the full sample.  Model 3 is a 
treatment effects model considering the non-random selection of a US private public company with a stock payment.  Models 4 and 5 separately consider the subsample of private and public companies.  Models 6-8 use the subsample of all Canadian 
targets, Canadian public targets, and Canadian private targets, respectively.  Models 9 and 10 consider the subsamples for US and other country targets, respectively.  Models 11-13 consider the subsample of stock, mixed and cash transactions, 
respectively.  Standard errors are two-way clustered by acquiring firm and year following Petersen (2009).  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  





Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Full Sample Full Sample Step 1: Private, Pay Stock, US Acquisition Step 2: Treatment Public Target Only Private Target Only 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant   0.164 2.76*** 0.110 1.95* -10.396 -5.34*** 0.072 1.11 -0.127 -1.39 0.116 1.59 
Firm Characteristics              
Private Target - -0.045 -3.02***           
VC-Backed Target + 0.107 1.65*     0.103 2.40** 0.177 2.93*** 0.118 1.72* 
VC-Backed Target * Cash Payment     0.105 2.79***         
Leverage of Acquirer - -0.002 -0.69 -0.002 -0.64   -0.003 -1.05 -0.002 -0.95 -0.002 -0.45 
Diversifying - -0.021 -1.10 -0.021 -1.06   -0.023 -1.73* -0.026 -1.08 -0.017 -0.82 
Standard Error of Equal Weighted Market Model - -1.083 -1.67* -0.972 -1.49 40.178 3.30*** -0.997 -1.77* 0.382 0.35 -1.243 -1.42 
Tobin’s q - -0.015 -3.47*** -0.015 -3.09*** 0.077 1.08 -0.014 -3.69*** -0.009 -1.26 -0.016 -1.92* 
Number of Institutional Holders of Acquirer   -2.477E-04 -1.22 -2.426E-04 -1.19   -2.219E-04 -1.33 -3.878E-04 -1.67* -7.760E-05 -0.27 
Log Assets   -2.463E-03 -0.80 -3.047E-04 -0.10 2.616E-02 0.18 4.679E-04 0.09 7.598E-03 1.71* -1.250E-03 -0.20 
Relative Size   0.013 0.57 0.020 0.88   0.026 1.14 -0.009 -0.30 0.055 0.96 
Country Effects              
US - -0.037 -2.44**       -0.064 -2.15** -0.034 -1.96** 
Other Country - -0.033 -1.43       -0.016 -0.60 -0.036 -1.11 
Public * US -   -0.029 -1.05         
Public * Other Country -   0.002 0.10         
Private * US -   -0.044 -2.93***         
Private * Other Country -   -0.049 -1.72*         
Payment Method              
Shares - -0.049 -2.69***       -0.035 -1.65* -0.064 -1.72* 
Mixed - -0.023 -1.76*       -0.022 -0.99 -0.018 -0.92 
Shares * Public -   -0.015 -0.65         
Mixed * Public -   -0.002 -0.08         
Shares * Private -   -0.070 -2.28**         
Mixed * Private -   -0.026 -1.63         
Shares * Private * US -       -0.219 -2.34**     
Market / Industry Variables              
Year dummies   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lambda         0.097 1.74*     
Model Diagnostics              
Number of Observations   736 736 736 270 466 














Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
  Canada Target Only Canada Public Target Only Canada Private Target Only US Target Only Other Country Target Only 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant   0.315 5.98*** 0.073 0.77 0.203 3.92*** -0.106 -1.08 0.245 1.04 
Firm Characteristics            
Private - -0.043 -2.92***     -0.015 -0.47 -0.052 -0.61 
VC-Backed Target + 0.033 0.54   -0.016 -0.42 0.126 1.41 0.152 1.79* 
Leverage of acquirer - -0.001 -0.47 -0.001 -0.31 0.002 0.64 0.004 0.66 -0.002 -0.29 
Diversifying - -0.019 -0.59 -0.051 -1.62 0.033 0.49 -0.016 -0.46 -0.136 -2.83*** 
Standard Error of Equal Weighted Market Model - -1.101 -2.09** -0.795 -0.76 -1.008 -1.25 -1.244 -1.08 -2.441 -0.79 
Tobin’s q - -0.016 -4.01*** -0.002 -0.35 -0.022 -2.38** -0.014 -1.28 -0.029 -2.23** 
Number of institutional holders of acquirer   -2.476E-04 -1.50 -6.804E-04 -2.55** 2.129E-04 0.73 -2.470E-05 -0.06 -1.148E-03 -1.27 
Institutional Investors and Target Same Country - 0.071 2.23** 0.114 2.22** 0.023 0.84 0.005 0.18 -0.100 -1.46 
Log Assets   -9.138E-03 -2.06** -1.167E-02 -1.74* 2.275E-03 0.26 -2.246E-03 -0.22 -2.840E-02 -1.24 
Relative Size  0.014 0.70 -0.011 -0.31 0.066 2.13** 0.140 1.29 -0.109 -1.52 
Payment Method             
Shares - -0.053 -2.40** -0.043 -1.78* -0.117 -3.29*** -0.070 -2.36** 0.107 0.94 
Mixed - -0.018 -0.96 -0.031 -1.17 -0.004 -0.12 -0.011 -0.29 -0.074 -1.48 
Market / Industry Variables             
Year dummies   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Model Diagnostics            
Number of Observations  457 217 240 196 83 

















Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 
  Shares Only Mixed Only Cash Only 






Constant   -0.023 -0.18 -0.027 -0.16 0.299 3.52*** 
Firm Characteristics         
Private - -0.065 -1.15 -0.016 -0.33 -0.044 -1.89* 
VC-Backed Target + 0.336 1.05 -0.141 -1.11 0.119 2.90*** 
Leverage of acquirer - -0.003 -1.24 -0.004 -0.90 0.002 0.61 
Diversifying - -0.013 -0.43 0.004 0.13 0.027 0.09 
Standard Error of Equal Weighted Market Model - -0.743 -0.44 -0.445 -0.20 -1.407 -1.19 
Tobin’s q - -0.023 -4.04*** -0.003 -0.32 -0.017 
-
2.95*** 





Log Assets   0.014 1.68* 0.012 0.74 -0.009 -1.61 
Relative Size   0.004 0.12 -0.005 -0.14 0.025 0.71 
Country Effects        
US - -0.112 -2.41** -0.021 -0.49 -0.037 -1.51 
Other Country - 0.075 1.25 -0.073 -1.73* -0.021 -0.61 
Market / Industry Variables        
Year dummies   Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies   Yes Yes Yes 
Model Diagnostics        
Number of Observations   149 207 380 











Table 8. Robust Checks with Alternative Dependent Variables 
This table presents OLS regression analyses of value-weighted CARs (Model 14), CARs from the composite index (Model 15), and the 
number of transactions (Model 16) of the acquirer firm for -40 days to -2 days prior to acquisition announcement.  Explanatory variables 
are as defined in Table 1.  Standard errors are two-way clustered by acquiring firm and year following Petersen (2009).  *, **, *** 
Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
  Value Weighted Composite Number Transactions 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant 0.143 2.58** 0.138 2.42** -7635.099 -1.70* 
Firm Characteristics       
Private -0.027 -1.77* -0.027 -1.73* -758.304 -7.02** 
VC 0.110 1.86* 0.108 1.73* 1515.131 1.20 
Leverage of acquirer -0.001 -0.55 -0.001 -0.66 140.512 1.04 
Diversifying -0.020 -1.25 -0.020 -1.27 280.155 0.74 
Standard Error of Equal Weighted Market Model -1.196 -1.79* -1.142 -1.75* 12597.190 0.53 
Tobin’s q -0.016 -3.55*** -0.015 -3.06*** 664.941 2.73*** 
Number of institutional holders of acquirer -1.801E-04 -0.97 -1.929E-04 -1.06 9.224 1.29 
Log Assets -2.994E-03 -0.94 -2.796E-03 -0.91 924.746 2.16** 
Relative Size 0.014 0.48 0.016 0.55 -143.470 -0.13 
Country Effects       
US -0.031 -2.06** -0.029 -1.88* 338.799 0.52 
Other Country -0.023 -1.11 -0.022 -1.01 1044.104 0.75 
Payment Method       
Shares -0.023 -1.36 -0.021 -1.25 -214.887 -0.41 
Mixed -0.013 -1.07 -0.013 -1.08 39.894 0.10 
Market / Industry Variables       
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Model Diagnostics       
Number of Observations 736 736 736 
Adjusted R2 0.124 0.120 0.198 
 
 Figure 1. Mean Runup CARs for Canadian targets by method of payment 
 
This Figure presents mean runup CARs for Canadian acquirers and both private and public Canadian 





Figure 2. Mean Runup CARs for Canadian public targets by method of payment 
 
This Figure presents mean runup CARs for Canadian acquirers and Canadian public targets by stock, 





Figure 3. Pre-announcement for US targets by method of payment 
This Figure presents mean runup CARs for Canadian acquirers and US public and private targets by 








Figure 4. Pre-announcement for US private targets by method of payment 
This Figure presents mean runup CARs for Canadian acquirers and US public targets by stock, cash and 











Figure 5: Mean Runup CARs for U.S. Private Targets by Quintile 
This Figure presents mean runup CARs for Canadian acquirers and US private targets by stock for 







Figure 6: Mean Runup CARs for Firms Acquiring Targets Financed by Venture Capital Financed  
This Figure presents mean runup CARs for Canadian acquirers and US private targets that were venture 
capital-backed for the event window -40 to +30 days. 
 
 
 
 
